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We  analysed  the  growth  impact  delivered  by a high-growth  entrepreneurship  policy  initiative  over  a
six-year  period.  Using  an  eight-year  panel  that  started  two years  before  the initiative  was launched
and  propensity  score  matching  to  control  selection  bias,  we  found  that  the  initiative  had  more  than
doubled  the  growth  rates  of treated  ﬁrms.  The  initiative  had  delivered  a strong  impact  also  on  value-
for-money  basis.  In addition  to  producing  the  ﬁrst  robust  evidence  on  the  growth  impact  delivered  by aeywords:
igh-growth entrepreneurship
igh-growth policy impact
ntrepreneurship policy
ublic sponsorship
mpact evaluation
high-growth  entrepreneurship  initiative,  we  contribute  to  public  sponsorship  theory  with  the  notion  of
capacity-boosting  activities  to complement  previously  discussed  buffering  and  bridging  activities.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).. Introduction
Although entrepreneurship has been an important policy focus
or decades, explicit focus on high-growth entrepreneurship is
uch more recent (Shane, 2009). In the European Union, for exam-
le, the ‘Gazelles’ Expert Group of the Europe Innova initiative
ubmitted its ﬁnal report in 2008 (Autio and Hoeltzl, 2008). The
rst policy initiatives exclusively facilitating ‘high-potential’ new
entures were launched in the EU around the same time, and
cademic work on high-growth policies remains nascent (Mason
nd Brown, 2013). Therefore, although there is increasing expe-
ience on how to design high-growth policy initiatives, little is
nown about whether such policies actually work. Our objec-
ive in this paper is to provide an early examination of the
bility of policy to accelerate the growth of high-potential new
rms.
Evidence-based policy requires evidence to support it
Sanderson, 2002). Solid evidence is particularly important
here policy decisions involve trade-offs across alternative
ourses of action – i.e., choosing ‘A’ over ‘B’ (Pawson, 2006).
igh-growth entrepreneurship is a good example of such trade-
ffs because high-growth policy initiatives select new ﬁrms
hat have potential and motivation for achieving rapid growth
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: erkko.autio@imperial.ac.uk (E. Autio),
eikki.rannikko@aalto.ﬁ (H. Rannikko).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.06.002
048-7333/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(Autio et al., 2007). Given scarce resources, high-growth policy
trades off against more inclusive entrepreneurship policies. It is
therefore important to have evidence that such policies are ﬁt for
purpose.
High-growth entrepreneurship policy is typically justiﬁed by
evidence that in any given cohort, only a small proportion of all
new entrepreneurial ventures create the bulk of economic bene-
ﬁts – such as new jobs (Acs, 2008; Birch et al., 1997; Shane, 2009).
This concentration of impact potential is one of the more widely
accepted ‘truths’ in entrepreneurship research and policy (Mason
and Brown, 2013). However, concentration of impact does not auto-
matically guarantee that policies to facilitate rapid growth in new
ﬁrms would be effective – or even feasible. Indeed, it is equally
widely accepted that ‘picking winners’ is difﬁcult – and that govern-
ments probably are poorly equipped to make this selection (Storey,
1994; Coad et al., 2014). This contrast between phenomenon-based
policy justiﬁcations and scepticism regarding governments’ abil-
ity to effectively implement such policies again underlines the
need for solid evidence regarding the effectiveness of high-growth
entrepreneurship policy.
Although the need for evidence is evident, assessing the
effectiveness of high-growth policy initiatives is challenging. Par-
ticipation in such initiatives is subject to double selection: only
some new ventures self-select to apply for such initiatives, and
not all applicants qualify. There is also out-selection, as not all
qualifying applicants complete the programme. It can take years
for growth effects to materialise: only a handful of high-growth
policies have long enough track record for meaningful impact
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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valuation.1 Controlled experiments (the gold standard of impact
valuation) would be prohibitively expensive. Finally, not all pol-
cy initiatives track the performance of their subjects systematically
nough to support impact evaluation. Because of such challenges,
ost policy evaluations struggle to contain selection biases and risk
ampling on the outcome variable. Solid evidence on effectiveness
igh-growth policy remains virtually non-existent.
We address the above gaps by analysing the impact delivered by
 Finnish high-growth entrepreneurship policy initiative, the NIY
rogramme of the Finnish National Technology Agency, Tekes.2 A
ecognised leader in high-growth entrepreneurship policy (Mason
nd Brown, 2013), Finland is one of the few countries with a long
nough history of high-growth initiatives to support the longitudi-
al design required for unbiased impact evaluation. Started in 2008,
IY is the ﬁrst Finnish policy initiative that explicitly targets high-
otential new ﬁrms. In addition to the long time series, we also
ave rich data to control for selection effects: although the NIY ini-
iative started in 2008, we started collecting data on the underlying
opulation and control groups already in 2006.
We  draw on the emerging theory of public sponsorship
Amezcua et al., 2013; Jourdan and Kivleniece, 2014; Schwartz,
009) to argue that high-growth entrepreneurship policy should
e able to deliver a positive contribution on the growth of high-
otential new ﬁrms. Because our empirical context consists of a
ase study of a single – although well-documented – policy inter-
ention, our analysis remains exploratory and evidence-producing,
ather than explanatory and hypothesis-testing. We  do not ask
hich features make high-growth entrepreneurship policy ini-
iatives impactful (or not), but rather, whether such initiatives
an be effective in the ﬁrst place, given the argued incapacity of
overnments to effectively facilitate high-growth new ﬁrms. We
resent evidence that selective, hands-on policy interventions that
ie support to milestones can enhance new ﬁrm growth beyond the
election effect. We  ﬁnd the impact of the NIY Programme to have
een robust against the post-2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. The effect
as also been substantial in value for money terms, as one Euro of
ublic funding has generated an average excess increase in sales
f 1.11 Euro beyond trend growth by 2013, with the sales growth
rend suggesting that the supported ﬁrms have been moved to a
igher trend-line of growth.
Our research offers several contributions. First, we summarise
haracteristics that differentiate high-growth entrepreneurship
olicy initiatives from ‘generic’ entrepreneurship policy. We  hope
ur compilation will serve as a helpful checklist for policy planning.
econd, we provide a coherent theoretical grounding for the study
f high-growth entrepreneurship policy and extend the applica-
ions of the public sponsorship theory towards growth facilitation.
hird, we move beyond the ‘picking winners’ argument by describ-
ng a policy initiative which, rather than ‘picking’ winners, retains
inners by applying a series of performance milestones. Finally,
e report evidence that policy initiatives can effectively facilitate
igh-growth new ventures.
In the following, we ﬁrst review emerging literature on public
ponsorship and high-growth entrepreneurship policy and present
 list of distinctive characteristics of high-growth policy initiatives.
e then present our general proposition. After this, we describe
ur empirical context and present our methodological choices, data
nd analysis. We  conclude by discussing implications for further
esearch and for high-growth entrepreneurship policy practice.
1 Examples include the Dutch Mastering Growth Programme and UK’s Gate-
ay2Investment (g2i) Programme, see Autio et al. (2007).
2 NIY is the Finnish acronym for “young innovative growth companies” (see http://
ww.tekes.ﬁ/en/funding/companies/funding-for-young-innovative-growth-
ompanies/). Policy 45 (2016) 42–55 43
2. Public sponsorship and new venture growth
Public policy interventions are justiﬁed when market mecha-
nisms fail and the production of public-good beneﬁts is possible
(Mahoney et al., 2009). Policies facilitating new ﬁrm creation and
growth meet both criteria. Lacking a track record, new ﬁrms face
an uphill struggle in accessing and mobilising resources and an ele-
vated hazard to survival (Aldrich, 2008; Stinchcombe, 1965). New
ﬁrms are also an important source of economic and social bene-
ﬁts, such as job creation, innovation and economic dynamism (Acs
and Audretsch, 1988; Acs et al., 2014; Davis et al., 1996). Recogni-
sing these beneﬁts, governments are keen to correct the perceived
market failures that new ﬁrms face in their quest to establish them-
selves as viable going concerns (Audretsch et al., 2007). Recently,
some researchers have taken to calling such interventions ‘public’
or ‘organisational’ sponsorship (Amezcua et al., 2013; Flynn, 1993;
Jourdan and Kivleniece, 2014; Schwartz, 2009).
Distinct from policies that promote speciﬁc activities, pub-
lic sponsorship promotes new organisations – notably, new
entrepreneurial ﬁrms. The range of desired organisational out-
comes promoted through public sponsorship extends beyond
performing a given activity within an established organisational
context (e.g., execution of R&D projects, as would be the goal of a
classic R&D subsidy) to cover more complex outcomes – speciﬁ-
cally, the entry, survival, and growth of new ﬁrms.
To achieve these outcomes, public-sector operators provide two
broad sponsorship functions: ‘buffering’ and ‘bridging’ (Amezcua
et al., 2013). With buffering, governments provide resources to
shelter ﬂedgling ﬁrms against adverse effects of internal resource
scarcity and external resource dependencies. In addition to ﬁnan-
cial subsidies, such resources can include, for example, low-cost
ofﬁce space, training and consulting services, tax breaks, and priv-
ileged access to government contracts. Bridging facilitates the
connectivity of new ﬁrms with important external stakeholders.
Bridging may  include, e.g., networking activities, ﬁeld building,
branding, referral, and tie facilitation with business angels and ven-
ture capitalists. Fundamentally, both buffering and bridging seek
to ameliorate resource constraints and attenuate resource depend-
encies that underlie the elevated hazard to survival in new ﬁrms
(Singh et al., 1986).
Thus far, public sponsorship has mainly focused on increasing
the ‘production’ of new entrepreneurial ﬁrms by lowering barri-
ers to entry and reducing the hazard of exit (Amezcua et al., 2013;
Schwartz, 2009). This has implied a generalist approach to suppor-
ting new ﬁrms of all kinds, in the hope that if a greater number of
new businesses survive, more ﬁrms will also succeed and create
new jobs (Shane, 2009). The dominant focus on enhancing survival
also implicitly acknowledges the stylised fact that governments
have no business picking winners, given the difﬁculty of recogni-
sing future high-growth businesses ex ante (Cantner and Kösters,
2012).
The generalist focus has dominated entrepreneurship policy for
decades, although the relative emphasis on buffering and bridg-
ing has evolved over time. In response to the focus Birch (1979)
helped introduce upon new ﬁrms in industrial policy, the 1980s
and 1990s witnessed a wave of policy initiatives to encourage new
ﬁrm creation. Such initiatives included new business incubators;
subsidised loans; initiatives seeking to alleviate regulatory burden;
and, for example, initiatives to turn unemployed into entrepreneurs
(Shane, 2009). While some new ﬁrm creation policies elevated
entry, it was  soon realised that mere creation of new businesses
is not very helpful if the resulting new ﬁrms are of poor quality.
For example, initiatives to get unemployed to start new businesses
are not very productive (Shane, 2009). Speciﬁcally, the ﬁnding that
small ﬁrms were effective in innovation (Acs and Audretsch, 1988)
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rompted policies to support innovative new ﬁrms through science
arks and R&D loans and subsidies.
However, the majority of science park tenants remained small,
xpert-intensive engineering outlets (Siegel et al., 2003).3 Con-
erting innovation into rapid ﬁrm growth requires skill, much of
hich can only be gained through experience. This insight spawned
umerous initiatives to boost the supply of equity funding towards
ew ventures from late 1990s onwards (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002;
U Commission, 1998). The idea was that equity funding comes
ith hands-on participation that helps unlock growth potential
Da Rin et al., 2006). Many early funding schemes were heavily
ubsidised from public funds, however, and the growth of private-
ector equity funding was slower. It was also learned that effecting
ew venture growth is difﬁcult without extensive contacts that
pen doors to growth opportunities (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001).
As experience from public sponsorship activities has accumu-
ated, the understanding of the contribution of entrepreneurship
owards economic growth has grown more nuanced. A particularly
nﬂuential realisation concerned the importance of high-impact
ew ventures (Acs, 2011; Autio, 2007; Birch et al., 1997). This real-
sation has prompted an increasing policy focus on high-impact
ntrepreneurial businesses (Autio and Hoeltzl, 2008; Henrekson
nd Johansson, 2010). This trend, however, would appear to conﬂict
he stylised fact that picking winners is no business of govern-
ents. We therefore take a closer look at the ‘picking the winners’
rgument.
The ‘picking winners’ argument made its way into
ntrepreneurship policy conversation in the late 1980s (Birley,
987), but the argument only gained wider traction in the early
990s (Storey, 1994). This term was ﬁrst introduced in the context
f technology foresight in 1983, with the message that picking
inners was exactly what governments should do: invest in
merging technologies that held promise of signiﬁcantly impact-
ng economic development (Irvine and Martin, 1984). This concept
lashed with the Thatcher government’s ideological stance that
uch choices should be left to ‘the market’ (Martin, 2010). It was
n this form (i.e., that governments should not pick winners) that
he concept was  introduced into the entrepreneurship policy
iscussion (Storey, 1994). Here, two key arguments were that,
rst, predicting the success of any given venture is difﬁcult even
or venture capital professionals, and second, that by favouring
ome ﬁrms over others, the government may  unwittingly crowd
ut viable alternatives (see David et al., 2000).
While informing survival, the public sponsorship theory has
aid less attention to new venture growth. The most salient argu-
ents have focused on buffering and bridging (Amezcua et al.,
013). The buffering argument is fundamentally passive, as new
entures are assumed to survive if insulated against harsh market
ealities. On the other hand, bridging is fundamentally a legitimacy
nd externality argument: ﬁeld creation enhances collective legiti-
acy of new types of ﬁrms, facilitating access to external resources
nd enhancing survival. Bridging also promotes knowledge spill-
vers and experience exchange. These mechanisms should help
acilitate not only survival, but also, growth.
We suggest that to better understand the impact of public spon-
orship on organisational growth, capacity-boosting mechanisms
eed to be considered (‘boosting’ for short, to continue the series
f b’s). While insulation may  promote survival, survival does not
utomatically translate to growth. To achieve growth, ﬁrms need
o actively pursue it – and they need an organisational capacity
o effect growth (Zahra et al., 2006). We  therefore propose a third
3 As many of these studies readily acknowledged, their designs did not allow
ontrol for selection bias. However, the reported evidence itself was  widely noticed. Policy 45 (2016) 42–55
mechanism through which public sponsorship may  yield beneﬁts:
the boosting of organisational capacities for growth.
How could public sponsorship help boost organisational capac-
ity for growth? Thus far, only few studies have explored the
anatomy of high-growth entrepreneurship policy initiatives. In
their study of nine countries, Autio et al. (2007) concluded that
one way to side-step the picking winners problem is by introduc-
ing a selection logic that emphasises retention over selection. In
this logic, relatively loose selection criteria would be used in ini-
tial selection, and support would grow more substantial as the ﬁrm
meets growth milestones. The initial selection should emphasise
strong growth motivation and require some check of ability, but the
capacity for growth would be demonstrated by meeting milestones.
They also recommended public–private partnerships to provide
customised, hands-on support to build organisational capacity for
growth. Finally, they emphasised networking among peers to dis-
seminate experience-based insights on how to effect organisational
growth. Mason and Brown (2013) additionally emphasised hands-
on support for internationalisation and the implementation of good
governance structures to strengthen the new ﬁrm’s capacity to
design and implement a proactive growth strategy.
The review above suggests that public sponsorship could facil-
itate new venture growth by emphasising boosting mechanisms.
Although the one-off selection logic of picking winners has been
widely rejected, it appears that the picking winners problem could
be alleviated by capacity boosting – i.e., targeting high-potential
new ventures with policy initiatives that are (1) highly selective; (2)
emphasise strong growth motivation as a key selection criterion;
(3) control milestone achievement and condition progressively
more substantial and hands-on support on the achievement of
speciﬁc milestones; (4) promote the exchange of experiential
insights on how to effect rapid organisational growth; and (5) rely
on public–private partnerships for hands-on, capacity-boosting
support. We advance that public sponsorship that emphasises
capability boosting should be able to overcome shortcomings
inherent in the ‘picking winners’ approach. We  therefore propose:
Proposition 1 – Policy initiatives that are selective, impose mile-
stones and focus on capacity boosting are able to accelerate new
ﬁrm growth.
Our goal being to explore whether high-growth entrepreneur-
ship policy can effectively sponsor new venture growth, this
proposition is designed to test whether the null hypothesis can be
rejected. The null hypothesis is that no impact can be observed. We
are not going to test whether any or all of the above listed char-
acteristics can be linked to organisational growth outcomes either
individually or as a group. As the classic discussion by Pressman and
Wildavsky (1984) demonstrates, the successful implementation of
any given type of policy initiative is always subject to uncertainty.
We also do not imply that the above characteristics are exclusive
to high-growth entrepreneurship initiatives only, nor do we  take a
position on how many of the characteristics need to be in place in
order for a given policy initiative to qualify as a ‘high-growth’ ini-
tiative. Consistent with our objective of evidence production, the
rejection of the null hypothesis will sufﬁce – i.e., the demonstra-
tion with reasonable conﬁdence that a given policy initiative has
produced a discernible impact on the growth of treated new ﬁrms.
We next discuss our empirical context.
3. Empirical context: the NIY Programme in FinlandOur objective implies an evidence-producing rather than a
hypothesis-testing research design. As such, exploring the impact
of a high-growth entrepreneurship policy initiative is challenging.
Especially in new ﬁrms, growth is a noisy outcome (Davidsson and
search Policy 45 (2016) 42–55 45
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Table 1
NIY participants (treated ﬁrms) by start year and funding phase.
Year the ﬁrm was selected into the NIY Programme
NIY Phase 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Sum
Phase 1 – – – 4 30 34
Phase 2 1 – 5 33 1 40
Phase 3 – 6 10 2 – 18
Completed NIY 12 12 7 3 – 34
Interrupted 8 13 9 4 – 34
Sum 21 31 31 46 31 160
Table 2
Age, length of participation in NIY, and Tekes funding received by NIY ﬁrms by NIY
funding phase.
Phase (12/2012) Firms Age (2013) NIY participation NIY funding (mean)
Phase 1 34 4.2 years 244 days D 255k
Phase 2 40 5.3 years 635 days D 631kE. Autio, H. Rannikko / Re
iklund, 2006; Delmar et al., 2003). New ﬁrms often grow in spurts,
ith periods of rapid growth punctuated by periods of slower
rowth and even decline. Because of the need to build legitimacy,
t can take a long time to effect growth in new ﬁrms (Stinchcombe,
965). Because of biases introduced through selection, a quasi-
xperimental design is required that permits the demonstration
f a meaningful impact of the initiative on growth trend before and
fter the intervention. These challenges mean that to satisfacto-
ily demonstrate a growth effect, longitudinal data is needed from
oth treated and meaningfully similar untreated ﬁrms, with a long
nough time period to permit the examination of growth trends
oth before and after the intervention occurred. These are impor-
ant challenges, in terms of both data access and given that policy
nitiatives explicitly targeting high-growth entrepreneurship are
elatively young.4
Given these challenges, we chose Finland as our empirical
ontext. Finland is widely recognised as a leader in high-growth
ntrepreneurship policy (Mason and Brown, 2013): it has experi-
ented with this policy focus from mid-2000s onwards. Finland is
lso a small and homogeneous country where access to information
s open and policy initiatives routinely evaluated. This ensures good
ata coverage. Policy agencies in Finland are also relatively few
nd centralised in the high-growth entrepreneurship area, with the
inistry of Trade and Employment coordinating the efforts of sub-
idiary agencies. This reduces noise from policy overlaps. Finally,
e were able to persuade the National Technology Agency Tekes
o cooperate in data collection over eight years. This is a remark-
bly long time horizon for any policy agency, given there was  no
uarantee that the outcomes would eventually show the agency in
avourable light. We  thus had a rare, almost unparalleled empirical
indow to study a phenomenon of increasing policy relevance.
We selected the NIY Programme of Tekes as our empiri-
al window. NIY is the ﬁrst Finnish entrepreneurship policy
nitiative that explicitly seeks to facilitate the growth of new,
ntrepreneurial ﬁrms. In planning since 2007 and launched in 2008,
he NIY Programme seeks to accelerate the growth and interna-
ionalisation of high-potential innovative new ﬁrms in Finland.
he NIY Programme exhibits all characteristics of high-growth
ntrepreneurship policy initiatives, as reported in the literature
eview: selectiveness, emphasis on growth motivation, capacity
uilding, hands-on support, networking, public–private collabora-
ion and the use of performance milestones.
NIY selects its participants from a pool for applicants. While
ekes makes the ﬁnal decision, this decision is informed by an
xternal expert panel comprising new venture experts and ven-
ure capitalists who interview each applicant. To be eligible for the
IY Programme, the new venture must: (1) exhibit strong growth
otivation and good growth potential; (2) show a good-quality
usiness plan and demonstrate capacity to implement it; (3) show
vidence of promising business activities and customer references;
4) demonstrate a competitive advantage that can help it reach a
trong market position; and (5) have a committed and competent
anagement team (Tekes, 2013). The NIY Programme is open for
oung (under six years old) ﬁrms that employ less than 50 peo-
le with a maximum sales turnover of D 10M and a balance sheet
otalling D 10M at most. The applicants must also have recorded
t least 15% R&D expenditure during the previous three years, and
hey must be domiciled in Finland (Tekes, 2013).
4 Google Scholar searches suggest that terms such as “high-growth entrepreneur-
hip” and “policy” did not start co-appearing in the scholarly literature until
id-2000s onwards We  checked several combinations such as‘high-growth
ntrepreneur*’ AND ‘policy’; ‘gazelle’ AND ‘policy’; ‘high-impact entrepreneur*’ AND
policy’.Phase 3 18 6 years 961 days D 983k
Completed NIY 34 6.7 years 950 days D 1013k
Interrupted 34 6.7 years 749 days D 488k
The primary focus of the NIY Programme is capacity boost-
ing for growth, but it also offers bridging services. As a boosting
service, NIY Programme offers ﬁnancial support for commissioning
expert services for business planning, growth strategy develop-
ment and strengthening the management competencies of the ﬁrm.
Up to D 1M public funding can be granted in several instalments
for developing the participating ﬁrms’ organisational capacities in
a hands-on fashion.5 As a bridging service, the NIY Programme
facilitates active networking among its participants and exchange
of experiences and good practices. NIY also facilitates links with
domestic and international venture capitalists. In itself, the NIY
Programme operates as a branding mechanism that enhances the
credibility of its participants.
The NIY Programme applies milestone design and uses an
external evaluation panel. Upon selection, Tekes sets customised
milestones for each participant. Participating ﬁrms need to meet
their milestones in order to remain in the programme. In the
ﬁrst phase, the participants have to successfully embark on a
growth track and demonstrate ability to compete in interna-
tional markets. At the end of each phase, participants present
their progress to an evaluation panel of venture capital investors,
business angels and board professionals. The panel assesses partic-
ipants’ growth potential, development needs, and their suitability
as an investment target. During consecutive phases, the partic-
ipating ﬁrm has to progressively build up its organisation to
sustain rapid growth, and also, attract non-trivial external fund-
ing. Depending on the ﬁrm’s rate of growth, funding support can
be granted in one or more instalments until the ﬁrm is eight years
old.
By the end of 2012, 160 innovative new ﬁrms had received NIY
funding. Of these, 34 ﬁrms had completed the Programme. A fur-
ther 34 ﬁrms had exited the Programme because of failure to meet
milestones. The rest of the participating ﬁrms were continuing the
Programme in different phases, as shown in Table 1.
The milestone conﬁguration is illustrated in Table 2. The 160
ﬁrms that had participated in the NIY Programme by the end of year
2012 are grouped by funding phase. By the end of year 2012, those
ﬁrms that had completed the full NIY Programme had received, on
average, some D 1M funding from Tekes; they were 6.7 years old;
and they had spent 950 days in the Programme. For those ﬁrms
5 As NIY does not offer low-cost ofﬁce space or subsidies to cover operating costs,
it  does not strictly offer buffering services. It does support R&D, though, which has
a  buffering effect.
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compares the difference in the outcome before and after the treat-6 E. Autio, H. Rannikko / Re
hat participated in the ﬁrst phase of NIY only, the mean age was
.2 years; the length of participation was 244 days, and the funding
eceived amounted to D 255k per participating ﬁrm.
. Data and methodology
.1. Data
According to a recent estimate, the Finnish technology-based
ew ﬁrm (TBNF) population consists of approximately 12,000 ﬁrms
ess than seven years old. TBNFs are young, entrepreneurial ﬁrms
hat develop and commercialise new technologies through their
roducts and services or apply new technologies as a distinctive
spect of their operations. In this context, ‘entrepreneurial’ means
hat the ﬁrm is not majority-owned by an industrial conglomer-
te. Technology-intensity is deﬁned in terms of industry sector (i.e.,
ACE) afﬁliation and includes technology-intensive services (e.g.,
nternet service providers). Of the 12,000 ﬁrms that meet these
riteria in Finland, some 1200 are estimated to be strongly growth
riented (Autio et al., 2014). This group constitutes the base popu-
ation for our analysis. Relative to the estimated overall population
f TBNFs in Finland, NIY participating ﬁrms represent only 1.3%, and
elative to the sub-population of strongly growth-oriented TBNFs,
IY ﬁrms represent 13%. Thus, the coverage of the NIY Programme
s quite notable relative to the target population of strongly growth-
riented TBNFs.
We  collected comprehensive longitudinal data from both the
reatment and control groups. The treatment group consisted of
BNFs that had applied and were admitted into the NIY Programme
also referred to as ‘treated ﬁrms’ later). The performance of this
roup was compared against two control groups. The ﬁrst control
roup consisted of TBNFs that were customers of Tekes (a sign of
echnology intensity) but had not applied for the NIY Programme
also referred to as ‘non-applied ﬁrms’ later). The second control
roup consisted of TBNFs that had applied to the NIY Programme
ut had not been admitted (also referred to as ‘untreated ﬁrms’
ater). We  started collecting data on the ﬁrst control group two
ears before the NIY Programme started, in 2006.
We collected longitudinal data on all groups starting either
n 2006 (the Finnish population of TBNFs) or in 2008 or later
NIY applicants). The data was collected from annual tax ﬁlings,
i-annual mail and web surveys, surveys conducted during the
pplication phase (i.e., after the ﬁrm had applied for the NIY Pro-
ramme  but had not yet been informed of the application outcome),
nd from Tekes records (project information and funding informa-
ion). We  conducted two waves of data collection per year between
008 and 2013. The survey questionnaires queried the ﬁrms’
rowth orientation and growth strategies (i.e., how aggressively
he ﬁrm pursued a growth strategy) and the ﬁrms’ internationali-
ation strategies. Multi-item scales were used to capture constructs
uch as growth orientation, growth strategies, internationalisation
rientation and perceived barriers to growth (notably, external
esource mobilisation).
We  concentrate on the 160 treated ﬁrms that were selected to
articipate in the NIY Programme by the end of year 2012. Our
nalysis does not differentiate between those ﬁrms that did not
omplete the programme and those that received full support. To
onstruct the untreated outcome of untreated ﬁrms (i.e., the coun-
erfactual) we use as control group NIY applicants that were not
ccepted in the Programme (‘untreated ﬁrms’). All NIY applicants
eceived our survey questionnaires. In both treated and untreated
roups we model selection through survey respondents. In the
esults section we also descriptively compare NIY ﬁrms’ growth
gainst the broader reference group that comprised TBNFs that
ere customers of Tekes but did not apply to the NIY Programme
‘non-applied ﬁrms’). Policy 45 (2016) 42–55
4.2. Data
Given that we have data to control selection into the inter-
vention as well as performance data both before and after the
intervention, we  chose propensity score matching with non-
parametric regression to estimate the average treatment effect
on treated ﬁrms (Heckman et al., 1997). This method is called
difference-in-difference matching when applied to two-point data.
The idea behind propensity score matching is to replace ran-
dom comparison of treated and untreated study objects, which is
not feasible in observational studies, by a comparison of treated
and untreated study objects that are matched by observable pre-
treatment attributes. Non-parametric regression uses all possible
control (i.e., untreated) units within a given time span as matches,
whereas most other matching algorithms use 1-to-1 or 1-to-n
matching.
The matching method makes two important assumptions. First,
it assumes that conditional on a set X of observed ﬁrm attributes
and unobserved ﬁxed effects, treatment participation (selection)
is random for those ﬁrms that have similar qualities (conditional
independence assumption also known as selection on observables,
or un-confoundedness). Second, for each value of X there is a pos-
itive probability of being treated or untreated (common support
condition). When these conditions apply, the treatment assign-
ment is said to be strongly ignorable (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
In the case of Average Treatment effect on Treated ﬁrms (ATT for
short), these conditions may  be relaxed (Heckman et al., 1997).
For the former, mean independence is sufﬁcient condition, while
for the latter it sufﬁces that the probability of being treated (or
not) is strictly below one but may  equal zero. Propensity score
matching with difference-in-difference approach allows remov-
ing bias resulting from unobserved differences as long as these are
ﬁxed in their inﬂuence on outcomes. Thus, an additional assump-
tion constraining our model is that unobserved factors are stable
in their impact on ﬁrm-level sales growth and that sales growth
trends are the same for both treated and untreated ﬁrms (parallel
trend assumption). Under these circumstances the realised sales
growth of treated ﬁrms corresponds to a genuine treatment effect
above trend, whereas the untreated ﬁrms’ sales growth equals the
trend.
The ﬁrst step of the matching analysis is to estimate the propen-
sity score, p(x) through probit or logit regression. This is the
conditional probability for a given ﬁrm to be selected into the NIY
Programme. We  deﬁne selection into the NIY Programme as the
‘treatment’, or D. For selected (i.e., treated) ﬁrms, D = 1, otherwise
0. The binary choice model thus takes the form:
Dit =
{
1 if ˇXit + it > 0
0 otherwise
Here, Dit is binary variable that deﬁnes the ﬁrm’s participation
(selection) status in year t. Xit is a vector of factors that affect
the ﬁrm’s probability of being selected into the NIY Programme,
and it is the error term. Since selection takes place on observable
attributes at the time of selection, we  include measures from that
time point in the vector Xit .
The next step of the matching analysis is to apply the received
propensity score to estimate the average effect of the policy inter-
vention. Since our performance data is longitudinal and covers
time both before and after the treatment, we apply a difference-
in-differences estimator (Heckman et al., 1997). This estimatorment of treated units against the difference in the outcome of
untreated units during the same period. The average treatment
effect on treated ﬁrms (denoted as ATT) for the difference-in-
difference estimator can be written as:
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Table  3
Descriptive statistics.
Treated
ﬁrms
Untreated
ﬁrms
n = 160 n = 66
Variable Mean Mean
Financial resource mobilisation 4.27** 4.80
Growth orientation 5.71*** 5.15
Growth self-conﬁdence 4.14 4.42
Preceived feasibility of international growth 6.25** 5.79
Year of founding 2007 2005
Sales (year 2007) D 369k D 385k
Sales (year 2008) D 441k D 402k
Region Capital (1 = Helsinki region, 0 otherwise) 0.65+ 0.51
Region Tampere (1 = Tampere region, 0 otherwise) 0.05 0.04
Region Oulu (1 = Oulu region, 0 otherwise) 0.05 0.02
Industry HTM (1 = HTM, 0 otherwise) 0.02 0.04
Industry KIHTS (1 = KIHTS, 0 otherwise) 0.63*** 0.32
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Table 4
Estimation of propensity scores (probit model).
Variable Coefﬁcient Std. Err.
Financial resource mobilisation 0.19+ 0.11
Growth orientation 0.18+ 0.10
Growth self-conﬁdence −0.19+ 0.11
Perceived feasibility of international growth 0.26+ 0.14
Founded year 0.11 0.08
Region Capital 0.12 0.36
Region Tampere 0.65 0.65
Region Oulu 0.37 0.68
Industry HTM 0.90 0.77
Industry KIHTS 0.58+ 0.32
Constant 232.18 176.44
Pseudo R squared: 0.19
LR: 23.03*ote: +, *, **, ***, indicate signiﬁcance levels of 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
two tailed).
TT = 1
Nt
˙i∈T∩Sp
[(
Y (1)it−Y (0)it−1
)
−˙j∈C∩Sp ωij
(
Y (0)jt − Y (0)jt−1
)]
ere, Dit is treatment outcome for ﬁrm i, and Y(0)j is non-treatment
utcome (comparison group) for unit j. T is post-treatment period,
nd t − 1 is the pre-treatment period. Nt is the number of observa-
ions in the treatment group T, C denotes the set of control units, Sp
enotes the region of common support, and ωij is the weight used
o match control units with each treatment unit. Each treated ﬁrm
as a difference,
(
Y (1)it − Y (0)it−1
)
, and its multiple matched pairs
ave average differences ˙j∈C∩Spjt
(
Y (0)jt − Y (0)jt−1
)
. The differ-
nce between these two values yields the difference-in-difference
hat measures the average change in outcome that is the treatment
esult for each treated case i. The difference-in-differences estimate
or treated cases is obtained by taking the average over all treated
ases in the sample.
Two limitations apply to empirical applications of propensity
core analysis with non-parametric regression. First, since there is
o parametric test available, bootstrapping is used to estimate the
tandard error of the sample mean difference between treated and
ntreated cases. Although this is common practice, it is suggested
hat results should be interpreted with care especially in case of
mall samples (Guo and Fraser, 2010). Second, because of the ﬁrst
roblem, researchers should study the sensitivity of their results
y experimenting with different bandwidth levels and by trimming
i.e. discarding non-parametric regression results in regions where
he propensity scores for the untreated cases are sparse). If the
stimated treatment effects exhibit sensitivity to different band-
idth levels and different trimming schedules, the results should
e interpreted with particular caution (Guo and Fraser, 2010). This,
owever, was  not the case in our study (see Table 5).
.3. Variables
In the empirical estimation, our outcome variable is sales
rowth. Objective descriptions of ﬁrm performance, realised sales
n particular, are easier to compare across different sectors than,
or example, balance sheet assets. In technology-based new ﬁrms
TBNFs), the number of employees tends to lead sales growth, and
t tends not to be as volatile as sales. However, sales may  or may
ot materialise after recruiting new employees. In contrast, sales
epresent demonstrable, real commitments by the customers of
he TBNF to take on its technology offering. We  operationalised
ales growth as the log difference of sales between the year before
he ﬁrm applied to the NIY Programme and realised sales during
ach of the three subsequent years. Thus, three different measuresNumber of observations: 87
Note: +, *, **, ***, indicate signiﬁcance levels of 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
of log differences in sales were used. From these three measures,
the ﬁrst log difference of sales (i.e., the difference from t − 1 to
t) is used to control for the parallel development assumption.
The last two measures (i.e., the difference from t − 1 to t + 1 and
the difference from t − 1 to t + 2) are used to model programme
impact. Table 3 shows the sales level for 2007 and for 2008 for
both treated and untreated ﬁrms. Note that there is no initial dif-
ference in the sales of the treated and untreated ﬁrms in either
year.
In the probit model of the PSM analysis procedure we use self-
reported survey items as well as sector, location and ﬁrm age to
identify factors that drive selection into the NIY Programme. The
choice of predictor variables was based on three principles. First,
given the low number of observations, the number of predictor vari-
ables is also limited. Second, since we  wanted to utilise maximally
the heterogeneity in survey answers, we  chose to apply single-item
variables instead of multi-item scales. Third, as NIY uses clear selec-
tion criteria, the variables in the probit model needed to reﬂect
these.
As a reminder, NIY selection criteria emphasise international
growth potential of the ﬁrm, its growth orientation, and the suit-
ability of the ﬁrm as an investment target. Given the qualitative
nature of the selection criteria, we  believe that survey data, col-
lected at the time of applying, presents a valid basis for modelling
the information on which the selection is based. Moreover, Angrist
and Pischke (2009) suggest that predictors that could appear as
outcome variables or variables that are affected by the treatment
status should be avoided. In our case, this applies particularly to the
number of employees. Consistent with these principles, we selected
four predictor variables from our survey data that emphasise the
suitability of the ﬁrm as an investment target, internationalisa-
tion, and growth orientation. First, the ﬁrm’s perception regarding
how easy it would be to access and mobilise ﬁnancial resources
proxied the suitability of the ﬁrm as an investment target. Sec-
ond, to measure growth motivation we asked the entrepreneurs to
indicate their preference between two conﬂicting goals: “we  pre-
fer longevity over growth” or “we prefer growth over longevity”.
Third, related to both growth and resources, we asked respondents
to indicate their agreement with the statement: “we could eas-
ily acquire the resources to grow rapidly”. Fourth, we requested
an estimate on the feasibility of international growth with the
following item: “it makes more sense for us to grow interna-
tionally than domestically”. All these data were collected with a
survey questionnaire before the admission decision was  known.
As we  have three cohorts of NIY applicants, the survey data for
the cohort of 2008 dates from year 2008, for the cohort of 2009
from year 2009, and for the cohort of 2010 from year 2010, respec-
tively.
4 search Policy 45 (2016) 42–55
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The ‘ﬁnancial resource mobilisation’ variable was measured
ith a reverse scored6 seven-point Likert scale (1 = very easy,
 = very difﬁcult). As seen in Table 3, the treated ﬁrms perceived
nancial resource mobilisation as slightly easier (mean = 4.3) than
ntreated ﬁrms (mean = 4.8; p < 0.05). ‘Growth orientation’ was
easured with a 7-point Likert scale (1 = fully agree). Table 3
hows that treated ﬁrms (mean = 5.71) exhibited higher growth
rientation than untreated ﬁrms (mean = 5.15; p < 0.05). ‘Growth
elf-conﬁdence’ was also measured with a seven-point Likert
cale (1 = fully agree). In this case, untreated ﬁrms (mean = 4.42)
xhibited greater growth self-conﬁdence than their accepted coun-
erparts (mean = 4.14), but the difference was not statistically
igniﬁcant. ‘Feasibility of international growth’ was  also mea-
ured with a seven-point Likert scale (7 = fully agree). Treated
rms (mean = 6.25) perceived internationalisation as more feasible
han untreated ﬁrms (mean = 5.79; p < 0.05). Statistically signiﬁ-
ant differences are not a problem as such, since the propensity
core matching technique pairs treated ﬁrms with closely similar
ntreated ﬁrms.
As additional predictor variables in the probit model, we used
rm age, industry sector, and the geographic location of the ﬁrms.
lthough all ﬁrms in both treatment and non-treatment groups
ere young, it may  be that slightly older ﬁrms would have had
ore time to commercialise they ideas and therefore be more likely
o join the NIY Programme. Therefore it was necessary to control
rm age in the probit model. Furthermore, growth rates may  vary
y sector, and regional entrepreneurial ecosystems may  differ in
heir ability to support venture growth. Therefore, both the industry
ector of the ﬁrms and their location were controlled in the model.
As can be seen in Table 3, the treated ﬁrms (founded in 2007 on
verage) were slightly younger than the untreated ﬁrms (founded
n 2005 on average). Two dummy  variables were used to control
ndustry sector effects. Industry HTM dummy  indicates whether
he ﬁrm operated in high-technology manufacturing, as deﬁned
y Eurostat (yes = 1). Industry KIHTS dummy  indicates whether
he ﬁrm operated in knowledge-intensive high technology ser-
ices, as deﬁned by Eurostat (yes = 1). Also other sector dummies
ere created but were eventually excluded from the model (no
igniﬁcant effect on outcomes was observed). As the industry dis-
ribution shows in Appendix A, most of the ﬁrms operated in
nowledge-intensive high-technology services. Firms in this cat-
gory mostly provide software design and programming services.
inally, three region dummies were included in the model. The ﬁrst
f these, Region Capital indicated whether the ﬁrm was located
n the Helsinki capital region. Region Tampere indicated whether
he ﬁrm was located in the Tampere region. Region Oulu indi-
ated whether the ﬁrm was located in the Oulu region. Also two
dditional location dummy  variables were tested but eventually
xcluded from the analysis, as they predicted NIY selection per-
ectly.
. Analysis and results
We  present two kinds of analysis here: a descriptive analysis of
ales growth patterns and the PSM analysis that controls for selec-
ion effects. The descriptive analysis is shown to illustrate sales
rowth patterns. In this analysis – which does not control for selec-
ion effects – we use both control groups, as explained above –
.e., the non-accepted NIY applicants (‘untreated ﬁrms’) and Tekes
6 To reduce data contamination due to questionnaire design (i.e., the tendency
f  respondents to score sets of consecutive questions similarly when completing a
uestionnaire), some scales were reverse scored in the questionnaire. This reverse
coring was  subsequently removed in the analysis and tables to enhance coherence
nd readability.Fig. 1. Mean and median sales for the treated NIY ﬁrms’ group and non-applied
ﬁrms’ comparison group between 2006 and 2012 (kD ).
customer TBNFs who  did not apply for admission into the NIY Pro-
gramme  (‘non-applied ﬁrms’). Fig. 1 shows treated ﬁrms’ (n = 56)
and non-applied ﬁrms’ (n = 101) sales growth between 2006 and
2012 for those ﬁrms for which we had full time series of sales
data from 2006 to 2012. The Y axis unit is thousands of Euro. The
NIY group consists of all ﬁrms that have participated the NIY Pro-
gramme, independent of the duration of their participation.
Fig. 1 shows that the starting levels of mean and median sales
were similar for both groups. For mean sales, both groups started
from approximately D 300k in year 2006, and the median sales were
approximately D 100k for both groups in the same year. Interest-
ingly, the development of both mean sales and median sales is
similar in both groups until year 2008, when the NIY Programme
started. After 2008, the median sales curve plateaued for the non-
applied ﬁrms’ group, and its mean sales growth curve stagnated.
Note that this stagnation coincides with the start of the global ﬁnan-
cial crisis. The development in the non-applied ﬁrms’ group is in
contrast with the treated ﬁrms’ group, whose mean and median
sales kept growing in 2009–2012. In 2012, the mean of sales for the
treated ﬁrms was approximately D 2M,  while for the comparison
group the mean of sales was  approximately D 1M.  The difference in
the development of median sales is similar. As such, these ﬁgures
provide a tentative suggestion that the NIY Programme may  have
had an effect on its participating ﬁrms that goes beyond selection
– a suggestion reinforced by the statistical analyses that follow.
Whereas Fig. 1 illustrates the sales growth of all treated ﬁrms
against ﬁrms that did not apply for the NIY Programme, we
next compare treated ﬁrms against untreated NIY ﬁrms without
matching.7 In Fig. 2, the mean sales levels for both treated and
untreated ﬁrms are plotted on the same scale independent of
whether the ﬁrms applied to NIY in year 2008, 2009, or 2010.
Thus, on X axis, zero denotes the start (acceptance) of the inter-
vention (or non-acceptance). Values to the left from zero indicate
pre-treatment time, and values to the right from zero refer to post-
treatment time. Again in this graph, the Y axis represents sales in
thousands of Euro, and the analysis includes all ﬁrms for which we
had full sales time series from 2007 to 2012 (40 treated ﬁrms and
41 untreated ﬁrms).
In essence, the graphs show that before the treatment, the sales
growth is broadly similar in both groups, and major differences only
appear after the treatment begins. For the treated ﬁrms’ group, the
mean sales in the two  years before the treatment was  D 351k, and
it grew to D 967k by the year when ﬁrms were accepted to the NIY
Programme. The growth of treated ﬁrms is largely similar to growth
7 We are not illustrating trends relative to the out-selected NIY ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms
that were admitted to NIY but did not complete the programme), because we only
had  full time series data for six of those ﬁrms from 2006 to 2012.
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effect on treated ﬁrms (ATT) which is persistent over the inspec-
tion span of three years.9 Point estimates suggest that the two-yearig. 2. Mean sales for treated ﬁrms’ group and untreated ﬁrms’ group from two
ears before application time to three years after the application time (kD ).
ealised in the untreated ﬁrms’ group: for the ﬁrms that applied but
ere not accepted to NIY, the mean sales two years before the NIY
pplication was D 193k, and it had grown to D 490k by the year the
rms applied but were not accepted to the Programme. In visual
heck, differences between the two groups only seem to appear
uring the post-treatment period. While the mean sales for the
reated group are D 2554k three years after the intervention start,
he untreated ﬁrms’ development has led to mean sales of D 996k.
hus, although both ﬁgures exhibit positive development, there is
 notable difference in the post-treatment sales growth.
Together, the graphs in Figs. 1 and 2 suggest a positive effect
f the NIY intervention on the sales growth of its participating
rms. Note that the graphs illustrate unmatched data, whereas
ur statistical tests use matched data, so the graphs and statis-
ical tests are not directly comparable. That noted, the graphs in
ig. 2 support the correctness of our assumption regarding paral-
el trend between treated and untreated groups prior to treatment.
his assumption receives further support in the analyses that follow
see also Appendix B)
We  next consider the PSM analysis.8 For this analysis we  used
ore observations, as we no longer required full time series of
ales data from 2006 to 2012. We  ﬁrst estimated a probit model
o predict the probability of acceptance into the NIY Programme
1 = accepted) and obtain the propensity score p(X) for selection.
able 4 shows the results of this estimation. Our survey-based
xplanatory variables appear efﬁcient in predicting selection into
he NIY Programme (p < 0.1). The easier the respondents perceived
nancial resource mobilisation, the more probable it was  that the
rm was admitted into the NIY Programme; the more the respon-
ents emphasised growth over survival as a strategic objective,
he more probable it was that the ﬁrm was admitted into the
IY Programme (p < 0.1); and the more feasible the respondent
erceived international growth to be, the greater the probability
f admission into the NIY Programme (p < 0.1). The growth self-
onﬁdence also exercised an effect on selection at 10% level, but
he sign of this term is opposite to expectation: the more difﬁcult
he respondents perceived growing their business, the higher was
he probability of selection into the NIY Programme. This may  mean
hat the selected ﬁrms are more realistic concerning the difﬁculty
f achieving growth and concerning the challenge of managing
rganisational growth. As for the other variables, the dummy  for
nowledge-intensive high-technology services was  the only sig-
8 We also conducted robustness checks using the 2-stage Heckman approach.
lso this method conﬁrmed substantial growth effect by the NIY Programme after
ontrolling for selection effects. Policy 45 (2016) 42–55 49
niﬁcant predictor, indicating that ﬁrms operating in IT sectors had
a higher probability of being accepted into the NIY Programme.
Table 5 shows the estimated average treatment effects for
the treated ﬁrms before (‘Unadjusted mean difference’) and
after accounting for selection effects (subsequent rows). All
analyses are carried out using kernel matching and impos-
ing common support condition. Conﬁdence intervals are
calculated using clustered standard errors by industry. As
outcome variables we  have three different log differences:
log [sales(t)] − log [sales(t  − 1)]; log [sales(t  + 1)] − log [sales(t  − 1)];
and log [sales(t  + 2)] − log [sales(t  − 1)]. As a reminder, the ﬁrst
outcome variable tests the assumption of parallel trend prior to
the start of the treatment and does not include any treatment
effect. For this variable, a non-signiﬁcant difference between
treated and non-treated ﬁrms would signal that the parallel trend
assumption cannot be rejected. The two  remaining outcome
variables capture treatment effects after one and two years of
treatment, respectively. The sensitivity of the results was  checked
by applying different bandwidths and by trimming (e.g., Guo
and Fraser, 2010). The results in Table 5 suggest that the NIY
Programme has had a positive impact on the sales growth of
its participating ﬁrms beyond the selection effect. In Table 5,
the unadjusted mean difference shows the difference in log
differences between unmatched treated and untreated ﬁrms (i.e.,
not accounting for selection effects). The ﬁrst row shows that
for the ﬁrst outcome variable there is a positive difference of
differences, but this is not statistically signiﬁcant. As there is
no statistically signiﬁcant difference in pre-treatment growth
between treated and untreated ﬁrms, the assumption of parallel
trends is upheld. As for the two  other outcome variables that
cover different treatment periods, we  see a positive, statistically
signiﬁcant difference in log differences between treated and
untreated groups. These statistics (without matching) indicate
that post-treatment sales growth for treated ﬁrms outperformed
the sales growth of untreated ﬁrms. The next row (‘Bandwidth
(default)’) shows the differences in log-differences after kernel
matching. In this case, the sales growth differences are larger
and statistically signiﬁcant for post-treatment periods, whereas
the difference for the pre-treatment period is also larger but not
statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, the parallel trend assumption is again
upheld. Note that for difference-in-difference point estimates, the
statistical signiﬁcance denoted by ‘*’ does not take into account
that the propensity score is estimated. Therefore, for these also the
bootstrapping-based 95% conﬁdence interval for the difference
of log differences is also provided. For post-treatment periods
this interval does not include zero, indicating that the difference-
in-differences is statistically signiﬁcant. For the pre-treatment
difference-in-differences, the conﬁdence interval suggests that
the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant, consistent with the
parallel trends assumption. As Table 5 further shows, the results
of the PSM analysis are consistent across trimming and bandwidth
speciﬁcations, and also, across different dependent variables. We
also ran bootstrapping with clustering for industry, and results
from this analysis are consistent with our overall ﬁndings.
In summary, therefore, we  conclude that there is good evidence
that the NIY Programme has created a signiﬁcant average treatmentaverage treatment effect on treated ﬁrms is 1.20, and three-year
9 Note that our design is conservative, as we included in the treated group also
ﬁrms that were accepted into NIY but did not complete the programme. On average,
the out-selected NIY ﬁrms had received D 488k support per ﬁrm. As the out-selected
NIY  ﬁrms had not received full treatment, the effect of this group is to drag down
the  growth performance of the treated group.
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Table 5
Estimated average treatment effects for the treated ﬁrms on sales growth: difference -in-difference estimation (DID) by kernel matching (common support condition imposed
in  all analyses).
Outcome measures: differences in logarithms of sales
Group and comparison log [sales(t)] − log [sales(t  − 1)] log [sales(t + 1)] − log [sales(t − 1)] log [sales(t + 2)] − log [sales(t  − 1)]
Mean difference
Unadjusted mean difference 0.44 0.70* 0.84*
(Std. Err.) (0.28) (0.34) (0.38)
Number of observations Treated, n = 66 Treated, n = 67 Treated, n = 64
Untreated, n = 64 Untreated, n = 58 Untreated, n = 54
Bandwidth (default)
Difference-in-difference point estimate 0.88 1.20* 1.30*
(Bias corrected 95% conﬁdence interval) (−0.28 to 1.62) (0.27–2.39) (0.10–2.46)
(Bias corrected 95% conﬁdence interval, clustered by industry) [−1.15 to 1.99] [0.20–1.70] [0.09–2.93]
Number of observations (on support) Treated: 41(35) Treated: 42(36) Treated: 40(35)
Untreated: 46(46) Untreated: 40(40) Untreated: 37(37)
Sensitivity analyses
Changing bandwidth
Bandwidth = 0.01
Difference-in-difference point estimate 1.06 1.42* 1.59*
(Bias corrected 95% conﬁdence interval) (−0.18 to 1.82) (0.16–2.51) (0.32–2.96)
(Bias  corrected 95% conﬁdence interval, clustered by industry) [−1.05 to 2.67] [0.68–2.06] [0.35–2.85]
(6/6/5 cases excluded)
Bandwidth = 0.08
Difference-in-difference point estimate 0.84 1.16* 1.21*
(Bias corrected 95% conﬁdence interval) (−0.30 to 1.73) (0.09–1.92) (0.46–2.04)
(Bias  corrected 95% conﬁdence interval, clustered by industry) [−1.99 to 1.50] [0.19–1.70] [0.04–2.98]
(6/6/5 cases excluded)
Trimming
Imposing 9% trimming condition
Difference-in-difference point estimate 0.96 1.29* 1.49*
(Bias corrected 95% conﬁdence interval) (−0.94 to 1.60) (0.31–2.07) (0.51–2.34)
(Bias  corrected 95% conﬁdence interval, clustered by industry) [−1.32 to 2.02] [0.60–2.62] [0.50–3.74]
(3  cases excluded)
N (2-tai
p
a
T
‘
o
h
ﬁ
u
p
t
t
t
s
f
b
ﬁ
v
a
t
i
m
b
t
o
T
w
i
c
p
a
i
sales for every support euro invested through the NIY Programme
(=1/0.97). For the 2009 cohort of treated ﬁrms, the corresponding
ﬁgures are 363% sales growth from 2008 to 2013 and a support
10 As a further conservative measure, in all analyses of NIY participating ﬁrms we
have removed outliers whose performance would unduly distort the analysis. Theote: ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ indicate signiﬁcance levels of 0.1%, 1% and 5%, respectively 
ropensity score is estimated.
verage treatment effect on treated ﬁrms is 1.30. According to
aylor approximation, log difference equals percentage change for
small’ changes. Given this, we conclude that within the time span
f two years, treated ﬁrms (i.e., participants of the NIY Programme)
ave grown their sales 120 percentage points faster than untreated
rms, and they have grown 130 percentage points faster than
ntreated matched ﬁrms over a three-year period. Moreover, com-
aring matching results to unadjusted mean differences shows that
here is bias in unmatched results which is 50 percentage points for
he difference over two-year growth and 46 percentage points over
he three-year period.
The literature on matching suggests that after the propensity
core analysis is carried out, it is important to check matching per-
ormance in terms of balance (Guo and Fraser, 2010). Checking
alance means analysing whether it is possible to make untreated
rms more similar to the treatment group ﬁrms with respect to
ariables that were included in the probit model. This issue is
ddressed in Appendix B. In summary, this robustness check shows
hat the matched sample consists of more similar ﬁrms than ﬁrms
n an unmatched sample of untreated ﬁrms, suggesting that the
atching procedure has been effective.
Although the PSM analysis suggests a signiﬁcant growth effect
eyond selection, one may  still question whether the policy initia-
ive has delivered ‘value for money’. As is clear from the description
f the NIY Programme, this is not a low-cost policy initiative.
herefore, although evidence of genuine impact is suggested, it is
orthwhile to consider the delivered outcome relative to funding
nvested. Table 6 shows our ‘value for money’ calculation con-
erning the impact generated relative to funds invested into the
rogramme. To illustrate the trends, Table 6 reports data from
ll 27 treated ﬁrms that were accepted to the NIY Programme
n 2008–2010; that have completed the NIY Programme, and forled). For DID point estimates, standard error does not take into account that the
which we had full time series of sales data that covered at least one
year of pre-treatment sales growth. As we  needed a long time series
to discern the impact of NIY on sales growth trend, the resulting
sample represents a sub-set of all NIY accepted ﬁrms. For exam-
ple, ﬁrms that we founded during the year they joined the NIY
Programme are excluded from this analysis, because evidence on
pre-treatment growth trend is missing.
All the ﬁrms in our value-for-money analysis had received full
NIY support totalling 1 MD  over the treatment period. These are
compared against a matching sample of 44 untreated ﬁrms (ﬁrms
that applied for the NIY Programme but were not accepted) for
which we had complete time series data from the same periods.
Note that our value-for-money estimate is conservative, as we
include in the cost side also support given to treated ﬁrms that failed
to complete the NIY Programme, yet only consider sales growth
achieved by those ﬁrms who did complete the Programme10. These
two groups offer the longest time series at our disposal, and we
compare their sales growth from 2007 to 2013 and predicted sales
growth from 2014 to 2015. The 2008 cohort of treated ﬁrms grew
its sales by 440% from 2007 to 2013. Its ‘surplus’ sales growth rela-
tive to untreated sales growth represented, in 2013, 1.03D of extraoutstanding example is SuperCell, the developer of the Clash of Clans iPad game,
which grew its sales revenue from 200kD in 2011 to 860MD in 2013. The capital
gains taxes paid by the owners of SuperCell in 2014 alone (they sold a 49% equity
stake to Japanese equity investor Softbank for USD 1.5 Billion in 2013) will have
easily covered the cost of the entire NIY Programme.
E. Autio, H. Rannikko / Research Policy 45 (2016) 42–55 51
Table  6
Value-for-money estimation of the NIY Programme impact.
NIY 2008 Year Prediction
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Sales. sum (kD ) 9223 12,827 26,992 33,727 45,809 44,547 49,797 60,986 68,271
NIY  ﬁrms (n = 11)
Change from 07 4.40 5.61 6.40
Sales.  sum (kD ) untreated (n = 15) 6258 10,320 12,271 14,758 18,948 19,687 23,259 25,988 28,717
Change from 07 2.72 3.15 3.59
Additional sales of treated over untreated ﬁrms 15,519 22,685 25,948
Support per extra sales Euro 0.97 0.66 0.58
NIY  2009 Year Prediction
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Sales. sum (kD ) NIY ﬁrms (n = 12) 7149 12,976 12,648 20,497 26,204 33,092 35,867 40,699
Change from 08 3.63 4.02 4.69
Sales. sum (kD ) untreated (n = 14) 3888 4621 4577 6010 9337 9216 10377 11538
Change from 08 1.37 1.67 1.97
Additional sales of treated over untreated ﬁrms 16,147 16,787 19,483
Support per extra sales Euro 1.20 1.16 1.00
NIY  2010 Year Prediction
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Sales. sum (kD ) 1762 2912 2463 4522 12,714 10,967 12,906
NIY  ﬁrms (n = 4)
Change from 09 6.22 5.22 6.32
Sales.  sum (kD ) untreated (n = 15) 4990 4063 4387 5951 5691 6032 6373
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Additional sales of treated over untreated ﬁrms
Support per extra sales Euro 
ultiplication effect of 0.83D surplus sales growth for every euro
f NIY support. For the 2010 cohort of treated ﬁrms, the correspond-
ng ﬁgures are 622% (growth from 2009 to 2013) and 2.18D surplus
ales growth for every NIY support euro (note the small n in this
ohort, however). The weighted average for the support multipli-
ation effect for all cohorts in 2013 is 1.11D surplus sales growth
er support euro invested, and for the 2008 and 2009 cohorts it
s 1.22D and 1.34D . Assuming a linear sales growth trend, the
xtra sales return for every NIY euro will be 1.23D (weighted mean
cross all cohorts). If we  did not include support spent on ﬁrms that
ere accepted but did not complete the Programme, the extra sales
eturn for every NIY euro would be 1.43D .
While these numbers should be read with caution given the
mall sample sizes (because high-growth policy initiatives are
ighly selective, the numbers tend to be small) and the general
olatility of technology-based new ﬁrm growth, they nevertheless
uggest considerable return on policy investment in the case of
he NIY Programme. Note that we are looking at changes in growth
rend, and sales increments are repeated annually and are expected
o persist over time. We  have also assumed a linear growth trend,
lthough sales growth in TBNFs tends to be subject to non-linear
breakthrough’ effects, once their technology is accepted by the
arket and positive externalities kick in. Given that the focus of
IY is on boosting an organisational capacity to achieve and sustain
apid growth, we believe that the growth trend assumption is rea-
onable. This said, the number of treated ﬁrms with sufﬁcient data
or this analysis remains small, and the value-for-money analysis
resented here is worth re-visiting as evidence accumulates.
. Discussion
High-growth entrepreneurship has been increasingly drawn
nto policy focus, as governments have recognised that not all new
rms contribute equally to the economy. This has contributed to
n increased interest in policy initiatives speciﬁcally targeted at
acilitating high-growth entrepreneurial activity. This interest has0.14 0.21 0.28
17,691 12,352 10,655
0.46 0.66 0.76
accentuated two relevant gaps in high-growth entrepreneurship
policy. First, although there is much activity in the high-growth
entrepreneurship space, the lack of appropriate performance data
has meant that there has been little evidence that such poli-
cies can actually deliver. Second, the policy focus on high-growth
entrepreneurship has re-introduced the age-old dilemma: do gov-
ernments have any business in ‘picking winners’?
These gaps mean that government interest is occasionally tem-
pered by skepticism. For example, Coad et al. (2014:91) noted:
[¨high-growth ﬁrms] are unlikely to be useful vehicles for policy
given the difﬁculties in predicting which ﬁrms will grow...¨.  To
advance policy, therefore, it seems important to remedy both gaps.
To address the dearth of theorising in this area we unpicked the
‘picking winners’ argument and suggested that governments may
still have a role to play in retaining winners. To provide theoreti-
cal grounding for analyses in this domain, we also applied public
sponsorship theory to frame our discussion regarding the effec-
tiveness of entrepreneurship policy initiatives that seek to facilitate
high-growth new ﬁrms. Complementing the buffering and bridging
arguments previously advanced in the public sponsorship theory,
we proposed a third mechanism through which public sponsor-
ship can advance new ﬁrm growth: capacity boosting. Whereas
the buffering and bridging mechanisms largely promote passive
survival, boosting is required to facilitate new ﬁrm growth. This
calls attention to active, hands-on policy initiatives that develop
the organisational capacity for growth. While this observation is
not new to policy practitioners, it nevertheless has not been exten-
sively discussed in the public sponsorship theory. This addition is
important, since it emphasises an active role for policy that goes
beyond resource provision, and also, emphasises public–private
partnerships. As a contribution to policy practice, we identiﬁed
distinguishing characteristics of growth-oriented policy initiatives,
and also, demonstrated that such approaches can deliver a real
impact on new ﬁrm growth.
Another key contribution of this paper is the production of
evidence to inform policy. Our data was collected in bi-annual
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aves over the period from 2006 to 2013, with control group
ata collection starting two years before the policy initiative itself
as launched. Such datasets are rare in any policy domain and
ractically non-existent in entrepreneurship policy initiatives. This
etup provided a rare opportunity to produce as bias-free estimate
s possible of the impact of the policy initiative without actu-
lly implementing a fully randomised, double-blind experimental
esign.
In addition to the carefully collected longitudinal data, a
trength of our quasi-experimental design was that we came closer
o comparing apples and apples, by selecting our control group
rom among ﬁrms that had applied for the NIY Programme but had
issed out on selection. The continued data collection from this
roup ensured high-coverage longitudinal data from both treated
nd untreated businesses. The results from the PSM analysis con-
rm, consistent with our proposition, that the NIY Programme has
ad a strong, positive impact on the sales growth of its partici-
ating ﬁrms. For example, the difference in log difference (as an
pproximation of percentage change) of sales for treated cases after
ne year in programme and untreated cases (average treatment
ffect for treated cases) was 1.2, indicating that the NIY ﬁrms had
rown their sales 120% faster than their propensity score matched
airs in the untreated group. This difference is both statistically
ery signiﬁcant (2-tailed signiﬁcance) and persists over three years.
mportantly, the growth-boosting effect is achieved during a period
f severe ﬁnancial recession, the tremors of which continue to be
elt in the Finnish economy even today. Our robustness checks also
estify of the robustness of this pattern, as our ﬁndings are con-
istent for two- and three-year log differences and with different
ropensity score matching methods. The robustness of our ﬁnd-
ngs across different propensity score matching techniques lends
redence to the conclusion that the growth enhancing impact is
ue to the contribution made by the NIY Programme itself, and not
ecause of the selection effect. Finally, our ‘value for money’ analy-
is suggests that the NIY Programme has also delivered good value
or policy investment.
We  offer several implications for both entrepreneurship the-
ry and policy practice. In entrepreneurship policy research,
any important issues concerning types and effectiveness of
ntrepreneurship policy have not been settled (Minniti, 2008; Acs
t al., 2014). These include high-impact entrepreneurship support;
he way it works; and the question of whether it is possible to gen-
rate a genuine impact on participating ﬁrms (Cumming, 2007).
his study contributed to the understanding of how high-impact
ntrepreneurship support operates by applying the public spon-
orship theory lens on the phenomenon (Amezcua et al., 2013).
ur key proposition was that policy initiatives that exhibit a high
egree of selectiveness; that stage support according to milestone
chievement; and that solicit active public–private collaboration
an be effective in facilitating the growth of new ventures. While
ontributing to the public sponsorship theory with our focus on
apacity boosting, we have also contributed towards policy practice
y highlighting characteristics of policy initiatives that are poten-
ially salient in facilitating high-growth entrepreneurial activity.
We have beneﬁted from privileged access to a longitudinal
ataset that has allowed us to estimate the impact of a high-growth
olicy intervention in unprecedented detail. Nevertheless, we have
ot been able to implement a fully randomised experiment, and
ur ﬁndings are therefore subject to some limitations. Despite our
est efforts we  did not receive pre-treatment survey data on all
reated and untreated ﬁrms, as some applicants failed to com-
lete our pre-selection questionnaire. We  believe it is reasonable
o assume that non-response has been random across successful
nd unsuccessful applicants, and no unobserved heterogeneity has
een introduced. However, this assumption cannot be checked due
o missing pre-selection survey data. Moreover, our analysis did not Policy 45 (2016) 42–55
differentiate between those ﬁrms that did not complete the NIY
Programme and those that received full support. We  encourage
future researchers to consider this within-programme selection.
When it comes to propensity score matching, we  assumed that it
is possible to observe ﬁrm attributes that drive selection into the
NIY Programme and use such attributes to control selection bias
in the statistical model. While we  have conﬁdence in the selection
variables used in our model, it is always possible that some factors
may  have been overlooked. Note, however, that the difference-in-
difference framework used in this study provides some remedy for
the unobserved variable bias, as it controls for the impact of unob-
served variables as long as this impact on sales growth is stable over
time. As our analysis suggested that both treated and untreated
ﬁrms were on a similar pre-treatment development trend (i.e.,
parallel trend assumption was  upheld), this provides legitimation
for the use of the difference-in-difference model. Another limita-
tion concerns statistical inference. When applying nonparametric
regression analysis of propensity scores in ﬁnite samples, the extent
to which asymptotic properties apply is not always clear (Guo
and Fraser, 2010). Therefore, it has been suggested that especially
in case of small samples, the results should be interpreted with
care (Guo and Fraser, 2010). In this study we followed the rec-
ommendation to calculate conﬁdence intervals for the differences
of log differences of sales by bootstrapping. We also tested the
sensitivity of our ﬁndings against alternative designs – notably, dif-
ferent bandwidths, and found our ﬁndings to be robust against such
changes (see Table 5). While this analysis supports the veracity of
our conclusions, this method, too, may  be subject to sample size
limitations.
A ﬁnal limitation concerns implications for practice. By empha-
sising retention of winners as a solution to the ‘picking winners’
dilemma, this study evokes another dilemma venture capitalists
face. We  noted earlier that predicting future growth is difﬁcult
even for venture capitalists. It is equally difﬁcult to decide when
to stop throwing good money after bad money. A shift of emphasis
from selection to out-selection requires discipline in out-selection
decisions. Public sector operators, who  are the ultimate source of
funding for policy initiatives, will likely ﬁnd such decisions difﬁcult;
this was  the anecdotal feedback we  received from practitioners
involved with the NIY Programme. Further research should explore
ways to guide out-selection decisions.
These limitations notwithstanding, we believe that this study
nevertheless presents the most robust design yet implemented for
the study of the impact of high-growth entrepreneurship policy
initiatives. We conclude that our hypothesis is supported: policy
initiatives that feature characteristics commonly ascribed to high-
growth entrepreneurship policy can deliver a non-trivial, value-
adding impact on the growth of technology-based new ﬁrms.
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Appendix A.
Table A.1 shows industry sector, location and age distributions
for treated ﬁrms and untreated ﬁrms. Concerning industry sector
we apply the Eurostat categorisation of manufacturing and services
industries according to their technology intensity. NACE revision 2
code aggregates are grouped into high-technology, medium high-
technology, medium high-technology and low-technology and to
E. Autio, H. Rannikko / Research
Table  A.1
Industry distribution of treated ﬁrms and untreated ﬁrms.
Sector Nace codes Treated ﬁrms
(%)
Untreated
ﬁrms (%)
High-technology
manufacturing
21, 26 4 5
Medium
high-technology
manufacturing
20, 27–30 3 5
Medium
low-technology
manufacturing
19, 22–25, 33 0 4
Low-technology
manufacturing
10–18, 31–32 3 3
Knowledge-intensive
high-technology
services
59–63, 72 58 35
Other 32 49
Table A.2
Geographical distribution of treated ﬁrms and untreated ﬁrms.
Area Treated ﬁrms (%) Untreated ﬁrms (%)
Southern Finland 80 66
Western Finland 4 13
Eastern Finland 9 9
Northern Finland 7 9
Åland 0 0
Missing 0 3
Table A.3
Age distribution of treated ﬁrms and untreated ﬁrms.
Share (%) of ﬁrms in age group in years by year 2013
Group 1–2 years
(%)
3–4 years
(%)
5–6 years
(%)
7–8 years
(%)
9–10 years
(%)
Treated 4 18 31 26 12
k
g
c
services used. Full survey items can be found in the appendix of oneﬁrms
Untreated
ﬁrms
0 0 0 60 40nowledge-intensive high-technology services. We  use the aggre-
ation at two-digit level to minimise chances that individual ﬁrms
an be identiﬁed in the reported data.
Table B.1
Comparing variables before and after propensity score matching.
Matching Mean 2010 
Variable Group Treated Cont
Financial resource
mobilisation
Unmatched 4.09 4
Matched 4.25 4
Growth orientation Unmatched 5.68 5
Matched 5.51 5
Growth self-conﬁdence Unmatched 4.21 4
Matched 4.48 4
Perceived feasibility of
international growth
Unmatched 6.21 5
Matched 6.17 6
Founding year (age) Unmatched 2005 2004
Matched 2005 2005
Region Capital Unmatched 0.65 0
Matched 0.62 0
Region Tampere Unmatched 0.04 0
Matched 0.05 0
Region Oulu Unmatched 0.04 0
Matched 0.05 0
Industry HTM Unmatched 0.02 0
Matched 0.02 0
Industry KIHTS Unmatched 0.63 0
Matched 0.62 0 Policy 45 (2016) 42–55 53
Appendix B.
Matching performance for propensity score analysis
Table B.1 illustrates propensity score matching performance
in terms of achieved balance. Table B.1 shows that the matching
was successful. This can be seen by comparing the mean values
of the matching variables for treated and untreated (i.e., control)
ﬁrms before and after the matching procedure. As an example,
the mean value for the ‘Growth orientation’ variable is 5.68 for
unmatched treated ﬁrms and 5.12 for unmatched untreated ﬁrms.
For the matched treated ﬁrms, the ‘Growth orientation’ variable
has a mean value of 5.51, which compares against the mean of 5.48
for matched untreated ﬁrms. Thus, the mean difference is much
smaller after matching, showing that the matching procedure has
been effective for this variable. The table further shows that the
remaining mean difference after matching is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant for any variable, again testifying of matching effectiveness.
The Region Oulu dummy  was the only variable for which the mean
difference increased with matching (indicated by negative reduc-
tion in bias). However, the t-test shows that the difference between
treated and untreated ﬁrms was not signiﬁcant either prior to or
after matching, so matching effectiveness was not affected in this
case. In summary, through matching, a reference group has been
created that is more similar to treated ﬁrms than without matching.
Appendix C.
Pre-selection questionnaire survey
The tables below show scales from which measurement items
were drawn to model selection into the NIY Programme. The pre-
selection and post-selection surveys queried the following topics:
The ﬁrm itself and its products and services; Resources and compe-
tences; Strategic goals and growth strategies; Internationalisation;
Product features and operating environment; Perceptions of Tekesco-author’s doctoral dissertation (Rannikko, 2012).
The ‘ﬁnancial resource mobilisation’ item was drawn from the
scale shown in Table C.1. The ‘ﬁnance’ item was  used (in the anal-
Bias Reduct-ion
in Bias
t-test
rol (%) (%) t p > |t|
.71 −41 85 −1.92 0.05
.16 6.3 0.28 0.78
.15 37 95 1.73 0.08
.48 1.9 0.08 0.93
.45 −16 80 −0.75 0.45
.53 −3.2 −0.14 0.89
.80 34.8 91 1.61 0.11
.20 −2.9 −0.13 0.89
 51 91 2.37 0.02
 1.2 0.06 0.95
.50 32 77 1.50 0.13
.59 7.1 0.30 0.63
.08 −15 0.9 −0.70 0.48
.09 −14 −0.59 0.57
.04 2.5 −481 0.12 0.90
.08 −14 −0.49 0.62
.08 −27 95 −1.25 0.21
.02 1.1 0.07 0.94
.41 44 75 2.09 0.04
.57 11 0.46 0.65
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Table C.1
Resource mobilisation scale.
How easy is it for you to access ... Easy Difﬁcult
←− ←−  → →
. . . Finance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
...  Competent managers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
...  Consulting and advice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
...  Competent personnel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
...  Distribution channels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Table C.2
Growth orientation scale.
We  prefer high
proﬁtability over rapid
growth
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 We  prefer rapid growth over
proﬁtability
We  prefer high
technical achievement
over rapid growth
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 We  prefer rapid growth over
high technical achievement
We  prefer longevity
over rapid growth
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 We  prefer rapid growth over
longevity
Table C.3
Growth self-conﬁdence scale.
How would you evaluate your ability to grow rapidly? Disagree Agree
←−  ←− → →
We  have the necessary skills to grow rapidly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
It  would be easy to grow rapidly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
We  could easily acquire the resources to grow rapidly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Competition in this business is tough 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Table C.4
International growth orientation scale.
Please evaluate following items for your ﬁrm Disagree Agree
←−  ←− → →
It makes more sense for us to grow internationally than domestically 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Our  marketing competence is better applied internationally 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Our  personnel is better utilised in international markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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AOur  current products support international markets better 1
Our  reputation and brands support internationalisation better 1
Our  current customer relations support international growth 1
ses we reverse scored the scale for internal consistency and ease
f interpretation).
The ‘growth orientation’ item was drawn from the scale pre-
ented in Table C.2. The last scale item was used. In the analysis the
easurement scale was transformed to run from 1 to 7.
The ‘growth self-conﬁdence’ item was drawn from the scale
resented in Table C.3. The second scale item was used.
The ‘internationalisation orientation’ item was drawn from the
cale presented in Table C.4. The second item was used.
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